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Abstract: The United States has proven to be and remains a dual political
party system. Each party is associated to its own ideologies, yet work by
Baldassarri and Goldberg in Neither Ideologues Nor Agnostics show that many
Americans have positions on economic and social issues that don’t fall into
one of the two mainstream party platforms. Our interest lies in studying how
recruitment from one party into another impacts an election. In particular,
there was a growing third party presence in the 2000 and 2016 elections.
Motivated by previous work, an epidemiological approach is taken to treat the
spread of ideologies and political affiliations among three parties, analogous
to the spread of an infectious disease. A nonlinear compartmental model is
derived to study the movement between classes of voters with the assumption
of a constant population that is homogeneously mixed. Numerical simula-
tions are conducted with initial conditions from reported national data with
varying parameters associated to the strengths of political ideologies. We de-
termine the equilibria analytically and discuss the stability of the system both
algebraically and through simulation, parameters are expressed to stabilize a
co-existence between three parties, and numerical simulations are performed
to verify and support analysis.
There is nothing which I dread so much as a division of the republic into two great parties,
each arranged under its leader, and concerting measures in opposition to each other. This, in
my humble apprehension, is to be dreaded as the greatest political evil under our Constitution.
— John Adams, 1780
1 Introduction
The United States has proven to be and remains a dual political party system. The 2000
and 2016 presidential elections have brought with them a growing number of voters
moving into third parties. The goal of this research is to study the movement of voters
between political parties, and the population dynamics amongst the voting class. To
evaluate these attributes, we will approach the issue using a nonlinear mathematical
model employing epidemiological methods with the assumption of a constant population
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that is homogeneously mixed. That is, the ideology and influence of a political party is
treated as a disease that a person can contract.
A deterministic model of the movement of eligible voters within a constant population
is presented. We determine the equilibria analytically and discuss the stability of the
system. Parameters are expressed to stabilize a co-existence between three parties, and
numerical simulations are presented to verify and support the analysis. This manuscript is
concluded with a note to instructors interested in conducting this type of undergraduate
research project.
2 Three-Party Voter Model
In [4], a deterministic model of the movement of voters between two political parties is
developed with an epidemiological approach. The model presented here is expanded to
include a third option that combines the “no party preference” and third parties. The total
population size, N , is assumed to remain constant. That is, for every person that enters the
system, another leaves the system. In the United States, citizens who turn 18 years of age
or immigrants who become naturalized citizens enter the class of eligible voters. Voters
enter the system at rate µN into the eligible voter class, V . The standard convention of
registering as a member of a political party when registering to vote is followed. It is
assumed that the choice an eligible voter makes is influenced by coming into contact with
a member of a given party and the probability the eligible voter contracts their ideology.
That is, an eligible voter enters a political party at a per-capita rate of β = pk where k
is the average number of eligible voters a member of a political party contacts and p is
the probability an eligible voter is convinced to join that party. Hence, the rate at which
eligible voters become members of Political PartyA, is β1V
( A
N
)
where AN is the probability
of coming into contact with a member of Party A. Similarly, the rate at which people
join Political Party B from V is given by β2V
( B
N
)
, and those who choose a third party
will enter C from V at a rate of β3V
( C
N
)
. It is important to note that voter registration
or party affiliation is interchangeable here with votes to a presidential candidate from a
given party in that the two acts are ultimately attributed to recruitment. As stated above,
the population is assumed to be constant, therefore
N = V +A + B +C .
Variables and parameters in the model are summarized in Tables 1 and 2.
V Population of eligible voters
A Population of Political Party A
B Population of Political Party B
C Population of Political Party C
N Total Population
v Proportion of eligible voters, V /N
a Proportion of Political Party A, A/N
b Proportion of Political Party B, B/N
c Proportion of Political Party C, C/N
Table 1: Description of variables in the model.
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Notably, not all people who are eligible voters register to vote. Hence, individuals leave
the system with out joining any political party at a rate µV . Once having joined a party,
voters may become ineligible due to inactivity, felony convictions, or death. Members of
political Party A, B, and C , leave the system at rates µA, µB, and µC , respectively.
The model also accounts for the movement of registered voters between political
parties. The per capita recruitment rate from one political party to another is denoted
by θi , for i = 1, . . . 6. Thus, the rate at which registered voters leave Political Party A
and join Party B is θ1A
( B
N
)
. Similarly, the recruitment rate at which members of Political
Party B join Political Party A is θ2B
( A
N
)
. Similar recruitment rates are defined for θi for
i = 3, . . . 6 and can be seen in Figure 1 in the diagram of the three-model system.
Figure 1: Diagram of the three-model system
µ rate at which individuals enter and leave voting system
β1 per capita recruitment rate of Party A from V
β2 per capita recruitment rate of Party B from V
β3 per capita recruitment rate of Party C from V
θ1 per capita recruitment rate of Party B from Party A
θ2 per capita recruitment rate of Party A from Party B
θ3 per capita recruitment rate of Party C from Party B
θ4 per capita recruitment rate of Party B from Party C
θ5 per capita recruitment rate of Party A from Party C
θ6 per capita recruitment rate of Party C from Party A
Ω1 Net Shift between Party A and Party B
Ω2 Net Shift between Party B and Party C
Ω3 Net Shift between Party A and Party C
Table 2: Description of parameters in the model.
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The solid lines in the diagram represent both the rates at which individuals enter and
leave the system and the rates at which individuals initially choose their political parties.
This initial choice will determine where most people stay within the system. The dashed
lines represent the recruitment rates from one political party to another.
The governing equations to the model are
dV
dt
= µN − β1V
(
A
N
)
− β2V
(
B
N
)
− β3V
(
C
N
)
− µV ,
dA
dt
= β1V
(
A
N
)
+ θ2B
(
A
N
)
+ θ5C
(
A
N
)
− θ1A
(
B
N
)
− θ6A
(
C
N
)
− µA, (2.1)
dB
dt
= β2V
(
B
N
)
+ θ1A
(
B
N
)
+ θ4C
(
B
N
)
− θ2B
(
A
N
)
− θ3B
(
C
N
)
− µB,
dC
dt
= β3V
(
C
N
)
+ θ3B
(
C
N
)
+ θ6A
(
C
N
)
− θ4C
(
B
N
)
− θ5C
(
A
N
)
− µC
where V (0) > 0,A(0) ≥ 0,B(0) ≥ 0, and C(0) ≥ 0.
2.1 Simplifying
To simplify the model, parameters are introduced to denote the net shift between political
parties:
Ω1 = θ1 − θ2
Ω2 = θ3 − θ4
Ω3 = θ6 − θ5.
The system is rewritten to reflect proportion of populations as opposed to population size.
The equation N = V + A + B +C is rewritten as 1 = v + a + b + c , where, for example,
a = AN (See Table 1). System of equations (2.1) is rewritten as
dv
dt
= µ − β1va − β2vb − β3vc − µv
da
dt
= β1va − Ω1ab − Ω3ac − µa (2.2)
db
dt
= β2vb + Ω1ab − Ω2bc − µb
dc
dt
= β3vc + Ω2bc + Ω3ac − µc .
The system is reduced to three differential equations by substituting v = 1 − a − b − c:
da
dt
= a[β1(1 − a − b − c) + Ω3c − Ω1b − µ]
db
dt
= b[β2(1 − a − b − c) + Ω1a − Ω2c − µ] (2.3)
dc
dt
= c[β3(1 − a − b − c) + Ω2b − Ω3a − µ].
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3 Equilibria and Stability
The equilibrium of (2.3) are denoted by (a∗,b∗, c∗), where a∗ = A∗/N , b∗ = B∗/N , c∗ =
C∗/N , and (V ∗,A∗,B∗,C∗) denotes the equilibrium of the unreduced system (2.1). Equilib-
ria occur in the party-free system E0(0, 0, 0), single-party system E1(a∗, 0, 0), E2(0,b∗, 0),
and E3(0, 0, c∗), dual-party system E4(a∗,b∗, 0), E5(a∗, 0, c∗), and E6(0,b∗, c∗), and in the
interior case E7(a∗,b∗, c∗). We derive each equilibrium algebraically and include discus-
sion on the stability algebraically in the dictatorship case (single-party equilibrium) and
via simulation in the endemic case. The party-free equilibrium E0(0, 0, 0) always exists
without any conditions on the associated parameters and corresponds to nonpartisan
systems where no official political parties exist. Refer to [4] and references therein.
3.1 Single-party equilibrium.
We derive E1(a∗, 0, 0), the equilibrium in a dictatorship system. We seek a > 0 such that
da
dt
= β1(1 − a − b − c)a − Ω1ab − Ω3ac − µa = 0,
where b, c ≡ 0. That is,
da
dt
= β1(1 − a∗ − 0 − 0)a∗ − Ω1a∗(0) − Ω3a∗(0) − µa∗
= β1(1 − a∗)a∗ − µa∗ = 0,
which implies
a∗ = 1 − µ
β1
.
Hence, we find the equilibrium E1
(
1 − µβ1 , 0, 0
)
. The equilibria E2(0,b∗, 0), and E3(0, 0, c∗)
are solved using the same strategy. Note that these equilibria only exist if β > µ.
3.2 Dual-party equilibrium.
Without the presence of a third-party, we can find the equilibrium E4(a∗,b∗, 0) by solving
the following system using Cramer’s rule,[ −β1 −(β1 + Ω1)
Ω1 − β2 −β2
] [
a∗
b∗
]
=
[
µ − β1
µ − β2
]
.
Thus
E4(a∗,b∗, 0) = E4
(
β2(β1 − µ) − (β2 − µ)(β1 + Ω1)
β1β2 + (Ω1 − β2)(β1 + Ω1) ,
β1(β2 − µ) + (β1 − µ)(Ω1 − β2)
β1β2 + (Ω1 − β2)(β1 + Ω1) , 0
)
.
This is consistent with the results in [4]. Similar computations yield E5 and E6,
E5(a∗, 0, c∗) = E5
(
β3(β1 − µ) + (β3 − µ)(Ω3 − β1)
β1β3 + (β3 + Ω3)(Ω3 − β1) , 0,
β1(β3 − µ) − (β1 − µ)(Ω3 + β3)
β1β3 + (β3 + Ω3)(Ω3 − β1)
)
,
and
E6(0,b∗, c∗) = E6
(
0, β3(β2 − µ) − (β3 − µ)(β2 + Ω2)
β2β3 + (β2 + Ω2)(Ω2 − β3) ,
β2(β3 − µ) + (β2 − µ)(Ω2 − β3)
β2β3 + (β2 + Ω2)(Ω2 − β3)
)
.
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3.3 Three-party equilibrium.
Finally, E7 is the equilibrium solution of most interest. It is also found using Cramer’s
Rule. We express E7(a∗,b∗, c∗) as E7(p∗1/q,p∗2/q,p∗3/q) where
q = −β1β2β3 − β1(β2 + Ω2)(Ω2 − β3) − β2(Ω3 − β1)(β3 + Ω3) − β3(β1 + Ω1)(Ω1 − β2)
− (β1 + Ω1)(β2 + Ω2)(β3 + Ω3) + (Ω1 − β2)(Ω2 − β3)(Ω3 − β1),
and with
p1 = −(β1 − µ)[β2β3 + (β2 + Ω2)(Ω2 − β3)] + (β2 − µ)[β3(β1 + Ω1) − (Ω3 − β1)(Ω2 − β3)]
− (β3 − µ)(β2(β1 − Ω3) − (β1 + Ω1)(β2 + Ω2)),
p2 = β1[β3(µ − β2) − (β2 + Ω2)(µ − β3)] + (Ω1 − β2)[β3(µ − β1) + (Ω3 − β1)(µ − β3)]
+ (β3 + Ω3)[(β2 + Ω2)(µ − β1) + (Ω3 − β1)(µ − β3)],
p3 = β1[β2(µ − β3) + (µ − β2)(Ω2 − β3)] + (Ω1 − β2)[(β1 + Ω1)(µ − β3) + (µ − β1)(Ω2 − β3)]
+ (β3 + Ω3)[(β1 + Ω1)(µ − β2) − β2(µ − β1)].
3.4 Stability Analysis.
The Jacobian of system (2.3) is given by
J =
©­«
Θ1 −(Ω1 + β1)a (Ω3 − β1)a
(Ω1 − β2)b Θ2 −(Ω2 + β2)b
−(Ω3 + β3)c (Ω2 − β3)c Θ3
ª®¬ ,
where
Θ1 = β1(1 − 2a − b − c) + Ω3c − Ω1b − µ,
Θ2 = β2(1 − a − 2b − c) + Ω1a − Ω2c − µ,
Θ3 = β3(1 − a − b − 2c) + Ω2b − Ω3a − µ .
We can now find the eigenvalues of J evaluated at each Ei to determine the stability.
For instance, in the non-partisan system, the eigenvalues of J (E0(0, 0, 0)) are given by
λ1 = β1 − µ, λ2 = β2 − µ, and λ3 = β3 − µ. Relative to the restriction for E1, E2, and E2 to
exist, namely βi > µ for i = 1, 2, 3; we conclude that E0 is unstable. Alternatively, the goal
of this manuscript will be to understand the stability of equilibrium using a simulation
approach.
3.5 Simulation approach.
Below we take a simulation approach to analyze stability of the equilibrium E7(a∗,b∗, c∗).
The simulations were run using ODE solvers in the SciPy library and plotted with the
Matplotlib library.
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Figure 2: Three-party simulation with µ = 0.01, β1 = 0.1, β2 = 1, β3 = 1, Ω1 = 1, Ω2 = 1,
Ω3 = 0.1
In Figure 2 the net-shift parameters are Ω1 = 1.00, Ω2 = 0.10 and Ω3 = 1.00. Hence,
the net shift between between Party A and Party B is to Party A, Party C dominates in
recruitment between Party A and Party C, and the net shift is to Party C between Party B
and Party C.
By setting the net-shift recruitment rate between Party B and Party C low at 0.10
and having the recruitment rates between Party A and Party B, and between Party A and
Party C be the same at 1.00, we are simulating a system in which two political parties are
initially dominant with the third political party, namely, Party B staying close to 0. Over
time, we see oscillatory behavior as the parties tend towards the endemic equilibrium.
That is, there is arise in the third party. This choice in particular seemed to capture the
recent pattern in which third-parties rise in American politics. Again, for our model there
are only three political parties and we consider the third one being made up of many
small political parties.
Over a longer simulation, the graph in the top left of Figure 2 shows how all of those
parties can chip away at the two major ones as the system approaches E7(a∗,b∗, c∗). The
trajectory observed over time and projected in the figures labeled Party A & B, Party A
& C, and Party B & C, produces asymptotic behavior towards E7(a∗,b∗, c∗). This could
provide insight into they dynamics that were observed in the 2016 Presidential Election.
An alternate dynamic is captured in Figure 3, with different parameters. This figure
shows that there are limit cycle solutions and has implications about the type of stability
displayed by E7(a∗,b∗, c∗).
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Figure 3: Three-party simulation with µ = .01, β1 = 1, β2 = 1, β3 = 1, Ω1 = −1, Ω2 = 1,
Ω3 = 1
4 Discussion
By including an influential third party to the system we were able to study how votes
can sway between the two major political parties. According to the Federal Election
Commission the 2016 and the 2012 Presidential Elections had very similar voting age
population size (N ) with 2016 having a 0.9% increase in voting age population. The
Republican party attained approximately 2 million more votes in 2016 than in 2012 and
the Democratic Party lost 0.1 million votes. However, there was an estimated 7 million
increase in the three voting classes. Therefore, the largest increase in population was
the third party class who rose from 2 million votes to more than 8 million votes. Hillary
Clinton did not visit swing states like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, and Michigan, implying
a lower recruitment rate. However, Donald Trump had a heavy recruitment strategy in
these states. Interestingly, the third parties having such an increase in their population
suggests they had the highest per capita recruitment from the other two parties.
5 Note to Instructors
The work in this paper was conducted during a one-year long experience with under-
graduates during academic semesters with a team of two faculty research supervisors and
seven undergraduates with varying previous knowledge of ODE’s and programming in
MATLAB and Python. The faculty approach is as follows:
1. Build a team with diverse skills; some have seen ODEs before, some have computing
skills, others have only seen linear algebra and the calculus sequence,
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2. Mini-lectures on MATLAB and math modeling; SIR article from MAA [5],
3. Gather voter data from different counties as well as nationally [2, 3],
4. Once students understand the two-party voter dynamical system [4], allow students
to build their own models – to answer their own questions which they formulate,
5. Provide feedback as they experiment with their models; i.e., run numerical simula-
tions and interpret outcomes,
6. Compare simulated results with collected data,
7. Write official reports, posters and talks for presenting; faculty period of reflection.
Expanding on point (4), the faculty mentors found that students were very passionate
about this project which was conducted during the 2016-2017 academic year. This lead to
much subjective writing from the students which faculty members had to channel towards
mathematical reasoning. For instance, students often conjectured the motivations of the
voter population before analyzing the model mathematically. Ultimately, we found that
this student driven interest in the project kept the experience fruitful. One cautionary note:
faculty are responsible for providing feedback so that model designs balance complexity
and functionality.
The results presented in this article lead to a starting point for a future academic
research experience with undergraduates focused mainly on analyzing the stability of
the remaining equilibrium both analytically and via simulation. Open questions remain
around any chaos present within the model, or present through the numerical methods
implemented in studying the model.
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